The Politics of Leverage – TruthAfrica Monitor
How is influence built, negotiated and exercised?
Leverage often appears long before it looks like geopolitics. A port deal, a citizenship bill, a media platform or a training programme can shift who has access, who sets the terms and who gains room to manoeuvre. Across Africa, these seemingly separate choices are becoming part of a wider contest over influence, autonomy and long-term advantage.
Africa in space: sovereignty or a shift in dependency?
African leaders and representatives of the space sector are increasingly framing greater control over data, technology and orbital resources as part of technological sovereignty. The debate is not only about developing domestic space programmes, but also about reducing dependence on foreign infrastructure and suppliers. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame warned against reproducing existing global inequalities in space, while Kwaku Sumah, founder of SpaceHubs Africa, emphasises that gaining greater control over data and intellectual property is crucial. At the same time, African states are not necessarily choosing a single bloc: Senegal participates in China’s International Lunar Research Station project and is also a signatory to the US-led Artemis Accords.
This debate over autonomy is also being drawn into competition among external partners. Sputnik highlights, in an interview with an Ethiopian expert, the problem of dependence on foreign infrastructure, framing it within a broader Russian narrative about sovereignty and reducing external dependencies. Meanwhile, ADF, a magazine published by U.S. Africa Command, warns primarily about the risks associated with Chinese projects: dependence on Chinese suppliers, operating systems, financing, and data-processing infrastructure. The debate is therefore not only about developing satellites, but about which models of cooperation genuinely increase African control over data, technology and infrastructure.
For African states, the challenge is to build their own capabilities without simply replacing one long-term dependency with another. For Europe, the question is not only whether it can gain a role in Africa’s growing space sector, but also whether its model of cooperation is seen as strengthening local autonomy.
Western Sahara: colonial history returns to politics
Spain’s Congress of Deputies approved on 10 September a bill that would allow Sahrawis born in Western Sahara under Spanish administration to acquire Spanish citizenship. The bill also allows first-degree direct descendants to qualify if their parent acquires citizenship through the proposed procedure. Reuters estimates that the measure could affect around 110,000 people. The bill is not yet law: it has been sent to the Senate, where it is being considered under an expedited procedure. The deadline for amendments and veto motions is 23 September.
Supporters of the bill present it as a way to restore rights to people connected to Spain’s former colony. In parts of the Moroccan media, the same history is interpreted very differently. In an opinion piece published by Morocco World News, the bill was described as a “colonial Trojan horse” and framed as a potential way for Spain to preserve its influence over a territory from which it withdrew. The article itself notes, however, that granting citizenship would not amount to a change in Madrid’s position on Morocco’s autonomy plan or constitute a territorial claim.
The dispute shows how colonial history can simultaneously serve as an argument for redressing past injustice and as a basis for accusations of present-day interference. A change in individual legal status can therefore become part of a much broader dispute over sovereignty, political influence and the interpretation of the colonial past.
Red Sea: strategic ports, competing partnerships
Competition in and around the Red Sea is increasingly centred on ports, trade corridors and security partnerships. An ISS analysis suggests that competition among external actors can strengthen the bargaining position of African states, while also deepening regional fragmentation. Djibouti remains one of the key hubs in this architecture. An analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicates that China has expanded the infrastructure of its military base there, increasing its communications capabilities and potential to conduct signals intelligence.
Somaliland is using Berbera’s location to strengthen its international position. Its defence minister confirmed that Israel is training local forces, while denying the existence of an Israeli base. Le Monde, meanwhile, reported on the UAE’s expansion of military infrastructure in Berbera and visits by Israeli military delegations, pointing to the possibility that the facility could also be used by Israel and the United States in the future. The precise nature of these plans, however, remains unconfirmed. At the same time, Somalia is deepening its defence cooperation with China.
In this environment, strategic infrastructure becomes a source of political leverage in its own right. In Somaliland’s case, Berbera’s value to external partners may strengthen its de facto international standing even without a change in its formal diplomatic status.
Mali: AI in the information conflict
In Mali, generative AI is becoming another tool in the information conflict. The Timbuktu Institute describes different levels of its use, from still-limited experiments by JNIM to synthetic personas promoting narratives favourable to Azawad. The report attributes the most advanced applications to the Russian information ecosystem, where AI can be combined with fake accounts and coordinated disinformation campaigns. At the same time, Mali’s authorities are strengthening their own side of the information war. Mali’s foreign minister described communication as one of the fronts in a “hybrid war of narratives” and Tafouk TV as a tool for promoting “narrative sovereignty”. AES regulators also established the Platform of Media and Communication Regulators (PAREMEC). Among the recommendations adopted were monitoring digital content, harmonising regulations, and “countering narratives unfavourable to the sovereignist vision” of AES states.
What is changing, then, is not only the technology of information conflict, but the broader environment in which the conflict unfolds. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are expanding their own media channels and shared mechanisms for regulating information, while AI is becoming another means of shaping the information environment, used by different sides.
In a region where independent media are already under pressure, the declared fight against disinformation is therefore becoming intertwined with the protection of the AES’s “sovereignist vision”. In practice, this raises questions about the line between countering information manipulation and restricting narratives that are inconvenient for those in power.
China: security becomes another pillar of cooperation with Africa
During the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, attended by representatives of the African Union and 41 countries, Defence Minister Dong Jun announced plans to develop multi-level cooperation mechanisms and capabilities in maritime security and other new areas of defence. He also invoked a narrative of China and Africa’s shared struggle against imperialism and colonialism, placing security cooperation within a broader narrative of historical solidarity and “common security”. The US-based Africa Center, affiliated with the Department of Defense, points to the Eagles of Civilization exercises and argues that the introduction of more advanced Chinese capabilities enhances Beijing’s own combat and expeditionary capacity more than that of African forces.
Security cooperation is also expanding in policing. In Nigeria, ties with China include sharing information and experience, as well as efforts to promote Chinese-language learning among police officers. The Nigerian example shows how security cooperation can feed into broader institutional and social ties. This does not necessarily mean a geopolitical shift towards Beijing – many African states maintain relationships with multiple partners – but it expands the range of institutions with which China is building long-term relationships.
For Europe, this means that competition with Beijing now extends beyond economics and infrastructure to relations with security institutions, as well as to the question of which model of cooperation African states find most useful.
South Africa–US: when a domestic dispute becomes foreign policy
The US introduced visa restrictions on individuals whom Washington deems responsible for policies enabling racial discrimination, expropriation without compensation, or incitement to violence against minorities. Reuters places the decision within a broader dispute between the Trump administration and South Africa over land reform and the situation of the white minority. Pretoria rejects this portrayal, arguing that its policies are intended to address inequalities inherited from apartheid.
Following the announcement of the restrictions, the South African government said that US actions were being driven by marginal groups that misrepresent the situation of the white minority. This does not establish a direct influence of any specific organisation on Washington’s decision, but it does show how a domestic political dispute can become internationalised.
In this case, the dispute over land reform and the position of Afrikaners did not remain confined to South Africa’s domestic political debate. It became part of the justification for US visa restrictions, showing that interpretations of domestic policy can have direct consequences for bilateral relations.
This edition was prepared by disinformation analyst Anna Pragacz and edited by senior editor Paweł Staromłyński.