Borrowed Credibility – TruthAfrica Monitor

When a story looks credible, the evidence behind it may go unquestioned.

Borrowed Credibility – TruthAfrica Monitor
Cover image generated with the help of AI

From AI-assisted misrepresentation to Russian media partnerships and recycled footage, this issue explores how narratives can acquire credibility and how appearances can become more persuasive than evidence. Across these cases, we examine attempts to borrow the authority of independent sources, the use of convincing but misleading images, and the ways in which separate incidents can reinforce allegations that remain unproven.

Russian media cooperation: training and the politics of fact-checking

Professional training is an important component of Russia’s media initiatives in Africa. In Niger, the state media regulator and SputnikPro jointly launched a training programme for approximately 100 journalists and other media professionals in October. In Madagascar, the Russian House announced plans to open a journalism school involving African Initiative, which the EU sanctioned for its involvement in Russian information manipulation.

These initiatives coincide with the Russia–Africa Media Forum, organised by RT, Sputnik, and TASS in Moscow from 26 to 29 October. During the forum, the Global Fact-Checking Network (GFCN), co-founded by TASS and Dialog Regions, proposed cooperation between Russian and African newsrooms on fact-checking. According to its own figures, the network includes 24 experts from 12 African countries. There is no public confirmation yet that the proposed joint fact-checking projects or local-language course adaptations have been implemented. These initiatives go beyond training journalists. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) documented cases in which the GFCN selectively presented information under the banner of fact-checking to support Russian narratives. Joint verification projects could lend these interpretations additional credibility if local partners publish them as independent findings.

The implications would extend beyond influencing news content to shaping the very process by which information is judged to be true or false. Russian narratives could thus enter African information environments not as Moscow’s official positions, but as the findings of seemingly independent verification efforts, acquiring a degree of authority that would make them harder to challenge compared to openly propagandistic messaging.

Ethiopia: archival footage in the battle to shape perceptions of the conflict

During the renewed offensive in Tigray, archival footage began circulating as purported evidence of current events. AFP Fact Check verified two videos shared on Facebook that were falsely presented as footage of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visiting Mekelle. In reality, one clip showed him addressing soldiers in the Amhara region in 2021, while the other depicted a cultural event in Addis Ababa in 2019. Both videos had been edited to remove details that revealed their original locations and dates. AFP also established that archival television footage from 2021 reporting Abraham Belay’s appointment as head of Tigray’s interim administration had been manipulated and presented as a current news report.

With independent journalists facing limited access to conflict areas, such archival footage can suggest that the prime minister personally visited Mekelle after the city’s capture and that the federal authorities had appointed the region’s leadership. Capturing Tigray’s capital is a military development, however, while establishing lasting political control and restoring a functioning administration are separate processes.

The manipulation lies in using false evidence of political normalisation to supplement genuine military successes. In this way, authentic archival material can help construct a narrative in which territorial control is presented as equivalent to the restoration of stable governance, even when conditions in the region remain uncertain.

Sudan: An AI-enabled attempt to influence UN accountability mechanisms

Anthropic described an information operation targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, which it attributed with high confidence to representatives of the UAE government. The operator used Claude to manage a network of approximately 300 inauthentic accounts and prepare materials published under the name of an organisation imitating an existing human rights group. Furthermore, they also drafted testimony for two individuals expected to speak at the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. The statements were designed to conceal any connection to the UAE.

The operator also compiled profiles of 18 Members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists, as well as dossiers on UN special rapporteurs who had criticised the UAE’s activities in Sudan. Anthropic disabled the account involved but could not confirm whether the testimony or dossiers reached their intended recipients or whether the operation influenced decisions by international institutions. The operation went beyond social media disinformation. It sought to introduce state-linked messaging into international discussions under the guise of independent organisations and witnesses, while also preparing materials concerning individuals investigating abuses.

The activities therefore targeted two important elements of accountability processes: the sources of testimony and the experts assessing the conduct of parties to the conflict. Although there is no evidence that the operation successfully influenced the UN, the case illustrates how AI can be used not only to produce content but also to disguise its origins and prepare materials targeting those conducting investigations.

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