The Gap Between Access and Control – TruthAfrica Monitor

Influence is not always exercised through alliances or public declarations. It can travel through ports, newsrooms and digital networks, or emerge in negotiations over financing and access to data. The cases examined in this issue show how these channels can be used to expand influence, mobilise political pressure or strengthen negotiating positions, and why their effectiveness depends on local actors, competing interests and institutional constraints.

Togo: The Port of Lomé in Russia’s military supply chain to the Sahel

The port of Lomé has become an alternative route for Russian military supplies to Mali. On 9 July 2026, the Mikhail Britnev, a US-sanctioned vessel carrying military equipment, docked at the port. The equipment was subsequently transported overland through Burkina Faso to Bamako. The operation represents a tangible outcome of the military cooperation between Russia and Togo that has deepened since 2025. In late September and early October, the two countries also discussed establishing an international transport corridor linking Russia to West Africa.

The significance of this cooperation extends beyond bilateral relations. Togo remains a member of ECOWAS, but it is also strengthening ties with AES countries, drawing on its strategic location and port infrastructure. At the same time, it maintains security cooperation with France and the US, which suggests a diversification of partnerships rather than a clear shift towards Moscow. The scale of Russia’s military presence remains unclear. Foreign Minister Robert Dussey denied the presence of Africa Corps mercenaries, acknowledging only the activities of Russian military instructors.

A single documented shipment does not yet prove the existence of a permanent military supply corridor, but demonstrates that Russia can also sustain its forces in the Sahel through a port in a country outside the AES. For Europe, the case highlights a strategic dilemma: Lomé is part of an EU-funded port security programme, yet the same port has also facilitated Russian military supplies to Mali.

Madagascar: Russia expands its influence in the Indian Ocean

Following the military takeover in October 2025, Russia expanded its presence in Madagascar. An investigation by INPACT and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) revealed that around 40 Africa Corps personnel arrived on the island in December, alongside General Andrey Averyanov, who is linked to Russia’s GRU military intelligence service. Russia supplies Madagascar with weapons, while Russian military personnel train Malagasy soldiers and help provide security for the President of the National Assembly. However, as ACLED notes, they are not engaged in large-scale combat operations, unlike in Mali.

At the same time, Moscow is expanding its information and cultural presence. In September, the Russian state agency Rossotrudnichestvo signed an agreement to establish a Russian House with African Initiative, an organisation sanctioned by the EU for disinformation activities. In a report republished by Boursorama, AFP describes trips to Russia organised by African Initiative for Malagasy influencers, including a group of 13 with a combined following of more than 3.5 million on Facebook. The Russian House has also launched Russian-language courses for Malagasy military and gendarmerie personnel to facilitate communication with Africa Corps instructors.

These activities combine military cooperation with efforts to build relationships within the local information environment. Madagascar’s strategic location along the Mozambique Channel increases the significance of Russia’s presence, but this does not necessarily mean that it will become a permanent foothold. According to a Malagasy political scientist quoted by AFP, Madagascar remains heavily dependent on European development funding, which Russia has not been able to replace.

China: Media influence between incentives and control

China uses a range of mechanisms to influence African media. In Nigeria, researcher Emeka Umejei explains how local news outlets distribute content from Chinese state media, supported by content-sharing agreements, training programmes, scholarships, and paid publications. In his view, the financial benefits of this cooperation may discourage journalists and politicians from criticising Beijing.

In Egypt, cooperation is more institutionalised. RSF describes agreements between Chinese and Egyptian state media, direct contacts between the Chinese embassy and journalists, and sponsored trips to China. Media cooperation is accompanied by major Chinese investments, including in the business district of Egypt’s new administrative capital and the Suez Canal Economic Zone, which strengthen Beijing’s position in its relations with Cairo. At the same time, Egyptian intelligence services monitor journalists’ contacts with Chinese institutions. In 2022, Mahmoud Diab, an employee of the state-owned Al-Ahram, was abducted before travelling to China. Three years later, he appeared in court on espionage charges. Another arrest of a similar nature was reportedly made in late 2025.

For Europe, these cases highlight two risks in assessing Chinese media influence. Monitoring Chinese state outlets alone may underestimate Beijing’s reach when their content circulates through local newsrooms. Yet treating such partnerships as evidence of political alignment may overestimate its influence, particularly where domestic authorities closely control media relationships.