E-voting disinfo ignites Zambia election panic

Sometimes all it takes in politics is a single spark — a rumour, a hint, an ambiguous claim — to unleash a wave of distrust. Estonia, Europe’s digital frontrunner, has spent years fending off narratives questioning its internet voting system. Zambia showed that a similar panic can erupt even where the technology itself does not exist. A few posts were enough for public frustration to merge with suspicions toward institutions. Within hours, a narrative swept across the country claiming that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) was secretly changing the law to introduce electronic voting ahead of the 2026 general elections. According to its authors, the move was intended to guarantee the ruling United Party for National Development’s (UPND) re-election.

Zambia’s e-voting panic

Between 11 and 13 July 2025, five Facebook accounts amplified a post by Kelvin Fube Bwalya that made the claims. In his post, Bwalya, the leader of the Zambia Must Prosper (ZMP) party, claims that the ECZ’s rollout of the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) is ‘a high-tech dictatorship’ designed to alter voter records and disenfranchise rural voters, offering no evidence beyond referencing unrelated political disputes such as the Lumezi by-election and Bill 7.

The narrative follows common anti-technology disinformation tactics, raising fears of data manipulation without a technical basis, and exploiting public unfamiliarity with biometric systems. Some users challenged the premise, asking: ‘Rigging against who?’

Others mocked the dramatic tone or questioned the author’s credibility. Pro-government commenters framed the statement as fearmongering, arguing that ABIS modernises elections, with one saying: ‘This is why we stay backwards — every new tech is met with suspicion.’

The posts received more than 60,000 views and 700 interactions.

In early August 2025, statements attributed to Michael Phiri appeared in Daily Nation, later amplified by lawyer Sakwiba Sikota, alleging that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) was preparing a secret statutory instrument to introduce biometric or electronic voting, supposedly already sent to the ministry of justice for approval.

The speculation spread so fast that on 06 August 2025, the commissions chief electoral officer, Brown Kasaro, had to respond publicly. He dismissed the rumours as ‘false and misleading’ and ‘aimed at creating unnecessary public anxiety,’ stressing that the commission neither planned nor had the authority to introduce e-voting. Any change to electoral law requires public consultation, government approval, a parliamentary vote, and presidential assent. Kasaro emphasised that reforms are transparent — the electoral reform technical committee had published its recommendations in June — and urged political actors to stop dragging the commission into politics and spreading misinformation that could undermine trust. He also explained that the automated biometric identification system (ABIS) used since 2006 is only for voter registration and has nothing to do with voting or counting.

Disinformation about biometric systems is not new in Zambia. During the 2021 elections, iVerify — an EU- and UNDP-supported fact-checking initiative — debunked similar claims. In April 2025, iVerify Zambia warned that election-related disinformation poses a major threat to credible elections, as it creates confusion, erodes trust, and sends voters to the polls with false beliefs that may ultimately damage the process’s legitimacy.

This crisis did not emerge in a vacuum. A real scandal was unfolding over the procurement of the biometric voter registration (BVR) system. BVR is the process of collecting biometric data from voters during registration to create a reliable, fraud-resistant voter list. Data from BVR is then processed in systems such as ABIS.

Transparency International Zambia uncovered serious irregularities, including the advancement of Miru Systems and Starlab despite concerns about their credibility and Miru’s record in controversial elections elsewhere. Miru Systems, a South Korean election-technology vendor, has been associated with disputed electoral processes in several countries, while Starlab is a local supplier whose limited experience raised additional red flags. Both companies were bidding to supply Zambia’s biometric voter registration system — a critical piece of election infrastructure — which meant any concerns about their integrity or capacity directly affected public confidence in the upcoming 2026 electoral process. Moreover, whistleblowers spoke of an internal ‘cartel’ within the ECZ influencing the tender, while others accused the Zambia public procurement authority of reinstating disqualified bids and sidelining compliant ones.

When technology meets suspicion

This mechanism is far from unique to Zambia. Estonia offers a striking parallel: a country that has conducted nationwide internet voting for two decades, with audited systems and regular security checks. Yet each election brings rumours and claims of manipulation. The Estonian electoral administration’s fact-check, I-voting fact check: myth and reality, notes that false narratives about i-voting circulate before every election. The Academy of Science Cybersecurity Committee also identifies disinformation targeting e-voting as a threat, warning that it can seriously undermine public trust and, if unchecked, create political pressure to restrict or even abolish the system.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), responsible for election observation and democratic standards, describes Estonia’s system as transparent and steadily improving. At the same time, ODIHR recommends, inter alia, strengthening technical transparency and expanding independent audit opportunities, steps seen as key to maintaining trust. According to experts, regular audits, individual vote verification and open counting procedures make it a secure election system. Still, part of Estonia’s political scene continues to question its integrity.

The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) has made scepticism toward e-voting a recurring theme, repeatedly claiming that electronic ballots are ‘stolen’ or ‘manipulated.’ Jaak Madison, an Estonian MP of the European Parliament, has described Estonia’s e-voting system as ‘an even worse mockery of democracy than in Russia,’ demanded access to the source code and threatened lawsuits. In 2023, after the Estonian parliamentary elections, the right-wing opposition party, EKRE challenged the validity of e-votes and filed several complaints, which were all dismissed. That year, the party led in paper ballots with 24.9% to the opponent Reform Party’s 20.3%. However, once online votes were included, the Reform Party, a liberal centrist party that has been a key governing party, rose to 31.2% while EKRE fell to 16.1% — a shift EKRE saw as supposed evidence of fraud.

Observers, however, found no significant irregularities. OSCE and ODIHR described the allegations as ‘unsubstantiated’ and warned that such claims fuel polarisation and erode trust. A 2023 survey commissioned by EKRE found that 39.7% believed the elections may have been partly tampered with and 38.3% of respondents doubted the reliability of e-voting, which was in stark contrast to earlier expert assessments showing trust levels were at about 70%. ODIHR’s 2025 legal opinion notes that declining trust is closely linked to ‘challenges and questions about its integrity raised by some political parties,’ with similar allegations in the 2024 European elections also deemed ‘unsubstantiated.’

Estonia illustrates a broader truth: the technical strength of an election system matters less than the narratives surrounding it. Disinformation thrives because political actors can benefit from undermining the truth. The lesson is clear: even the most advanced system cannot defend itself. In the digital age, election integrity depends as much on communication and society’s resilience to manipulation as on technology.

Although Zambia and Estonia are different worlds, both show that elections hinge less on technology than on public trust. Zambia demonstrated that even a non-existent technology can spark tensions, while Estonia shows that even the most advanced system can become a target when politics fuels doubt. Complex technical processes are easily recast as stories of manipulation because distrust spreads faster than understanding and emotions often overpower facts. Electoral technologies are only tools. Whether they build trust or fuel hysteria depends on who shapes the narrative. Disinformation does not attack procedures — it attacks trust.

---

This article was written by Anna Pragacz, a freelance journalist working with the Pravda Association, and edited by senior editor Eva Vajda and iLAB managing editor Athandiwe Saba.